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STATE OF UTAH, 
P ] a i n 11 f f / App e ] ] e e, 
vs. 
STUART EARL JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Ca«-<' U« i. 98 00*7 T-ra 
Pri ori ty I I : • 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
\> u i b u. J n i i i ii i 
78-2a-3(2)(e). 
.-.i <._-• i - - t i . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 . W ^ P 4 - • • •• 
Johnson's morit;. ;c suppress evidence ana . rinding *,ne 
warrantless search ;~~ +-~ hr ^rsti^ied bv "exigent 
circumstances. . la^iu^x 1JUU-:..L I .- ilea court that 
underlie its decision + grant- , - ar i • -• m ' <p *- suppress will 
court'. \rj... conclusions art- jevid*»d io: correctness, with a 
measu ' . . \-^: on of 
the 1-gai standard tc the facu.?.'" State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 
380' ( • ' '•'* 
1 
This issue was preserved in a pre-trial motion and at a 
suppression hearing (R. 22-39, 57-74). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath and affirmation 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Stuart Earl Johnson appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
order of Probation and a year in the Utah County Jail by the 
Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Fourth District Court, on December 
10, 1997, after the denial of Johnson's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence and the entry of a conditional plea to Possession of 
Marijuana in a Drug Free Zone, a Third Degree Felony. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Johnson was charged by information filed on or about 
November 22, 1996, with two violations of the controlled 
substances act (R. 2). 
After a preliminary hearing (R. 11) and the entry of "not 
guilty" pleas at arraignment (R. 16), Johnson filed a Motion to 
Suppress the Evidence under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 22-
39). Johnson argued that the warrantless search of the house 
wherein he was found was without his consent and was not 
justified by "exigent circumstances" (Id.). 
On July 1, 1997, a suppression hearing was conducted before 
Judge Burningham and the trial court subsequently denied 
Johnson's Motion to Suppress (R. 48-49, 57-74). 
Johnson entered a conditional plea of "guilty" to Possession 
of Marijuana in a Drug Free Zone, a third degree felony and he 
was sentenced to thirty-six months probation and 14 days in the 
Utah County Jail Work Diversion Program (R. 99-104, 119-20). On 
February 5, 1998, Johnson filed a Stipulated Motion to Extend 
Time to Appeal; and he subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal with 
the Fourth District Court on February 6, 1998, challenging the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress(R. 115-117, 125-
26) . 
3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 16, 1996 Provo City police officers were 
dispatched to 980 North 646 West in Provo because a neighbor was 
complaining about an odor of marijuana coming from the downstairs 
apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 5-6).1 The building was either a four-
plex or duplex with upstairs and downstairs apartments with 
shared walls (Supp. Hrg. at 15). 
Officers Eric Knudsen and Trent Halladay arrived at the 
apartment complex at approximately 11:30 p.m. and spoke with the 
complainants, Troy Guevara and Jason Campbell, just outside the 
apartment complex (Supp. Hrg. at 6-7, 22). Guevara and Campbell 
again indicated to the officers that they could detect an odor of 
burnt marijuana coming from the downstairs apartment and that 
they didn't believe the renter or owner of the apartment was 
present and that they didn't know or recognize any of the people 
in the apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 7, 22, 29). Knudsen did not ask 
the complainants about their knowledge of the apartments 
owner/occupants (Supp. Hrg. at 17). 
Present with Guevara and Campbell, according to Knudsen, was 
J.C. Thomas Anderson, whom Guevara and Campbell said had been in 
the apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 7-8). Officer Eric Knudsen "spoke 
with [Anderson] briefly for a second" and was told upon 
*The transcript of the suppression hearing is found at R. 
57-74. 
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questioning that Anderson did not live in the downstairs 
apartment but was just visiting (Supp. Hrg. at 8). Knudsen did 
not make inquiry with Anderson as to the apartment's owner (Supp, 
Hrg. at 16). Knudsen did not personally know if Anderson had 
been in the downstairs apartment (Id.). Halliday could not 
recall participating in any conversation with Anderson (Supp. 
Hrg. at 29). 
Knudsen then looked down the stairwell to the downstairs 
apartment and "saw the door was slightly open" (Supp. Hrg. at 8). 
As Knudsen then walked down the stairs, someone from the inside 
shut the door (Supp. Hrg. at 9). At this point Knudsen could not 
detect any noticeable odors (although on cross-examination he 
indicated he could smell marijuana coming from Anderson) (Supp. 
Hrg. at 9, 17). Halliday also indicated that he only smelled 
marijuana "when we approached the house" and after the door was 
opened (Supp. Hrg. at 28) . 
Knudsen knocked several times on the door with no answer 
although he could hear "rustling around" (Supp. Hrg. at 9, 12, 
20). Knudsen then checked the door handle to see if it was 
locked and finding it unlocked he opened the door approximately a 
few feet (Supp. Hrg. at 9-10). Knudsen did not have permission 
to enter the apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 19).2 
2Halliday testified that he and Knudsen went down the 
stairwell and knocked on the door which was opened by a young man 
(Supp. Hrg. at 23). Halliday testified he was behind Knudsen 
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Knudsen testified that the room appeared dark from where he 
stood in the doorway; and that he did not advance any further 
into the home but simply announced his identity and that he 
wished to speak with an occupant (Supp. Hrg. at 10). Knudsen 
(and Halliday) testified that "immediately after opening" the 
door he could smell an odor of marijuana (Supp. Hrg. at 10, 24) . 
The officers testified that they saw no weapons or people in the 
apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 20, 31) . 
Upon opening the door and identifying himself, Knudsen (and 
Halliday) were informed by another officer that some individuals 
were running from the back of the building and that officer then 
gave foot pursuit (Supp. Hrg. at 10, 19-20, 30) . 
Eventually Knudsen left the apartment and apprehended two 
individuals (Supp. Hrg. at 10). Approximately 7-8 individuals 
were apprehended by the two officers (Supp. Hrg. at 11, 24). 
These individuals "were all brought back to the outside of the 
apartment and sat down on the north curb" (Supp. Hrg. at 11). 
When asked the individuals informed the officers that none of 
them lived in the downstairs apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 11, 24). 
In addition, the individuals either did not know—or would not 
tell—who owned the apartment (Id.). Approximately fifteen 
minutes elapsed between the time Knudsen entered the apartment 
(Id.). Halliday testified that Knudsen asked the individual 
whose apartment it was and "the gentleman couldn't give us an 
answer" (Supp. Hrg. at 24). 
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and the officers questioning of the individuals (Id.). 
Knudsen then had officers John (or Juanda) and Halliday 
search the apartment because he "couldn't find out who the owner 
was [and he] wasn't sure if there was still someone in the 
apartment" (Supp. Hrg. at 12). Knudsen said he did this out of 
concern for "officer safety" (Id.)- Knudsen testified he was 
concerned with a possible burglary/trespass upon speaking with 
the complainants (Supp. Hrg. at 12,33), however, Halliday 
testified that he did not suspect a trespass until the 
individuals were apprehended and questioned (Supp. Hrg. at 30, 
32) . 
Halliday and John searched the apartment and located Johnson 
locked in a bathroom (Supp. Hrg. at 25). In addition, a 
marijuana bong was discovered in a bedroom (Id). The officers 
then took Johnson outside and Knudsen then left and obtained a 
search warrant and executed it on the premises (Supp. Hrg. at 21, 
26). During the execution of the warrant, the officers located 
marijuana in the apartment. 
After the denial of Johnson's motion to suppress, he 
subsequently entered a conditional plea of "guilty" to Possession 
of marijuana in a Drug Free Zone with a prior conviction, a Third 
Degree Felony; and he was sentenced to three years probation and 
14 days in the Utah County Jail Work Diversion Program. 
In a supplemental report filed with the Utah County 
7 
Attorney's office, Knudsen attached a note to the prosecutor 
which said: "Sorry for the confusion on the report. I was not 
involved in this case as much as I should have been. Other 
officers were assisting also and therefore some of the decisions 
made may have been questionable" (Supp. Hrg. at 34-35). However, 
Knudsen clarified on redirect examination that the confusion only 
involved individuals at the scene (Supp. Hrg. at 36). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Warrantless searches of homes are violative of Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution unless conducted pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. In this case, 
the trial court concluded that the warrantless searches of 
Johnson's residence were justified under an "exigent 
circumstances" theory. Johnson asserts that the trial court's 
decision is erroneous because no exigent circumstances were 
present at the time of the officer opening the door to the 
private residence nor at the time the warrantless "security 
sweep" search was made. It was necessary for the protection of 
the police or the preservation of the evidence or to prevent the 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF JOHNSON'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HISRESIDENCE WAS REASONABLE 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, particularly 
in one's home. Indeed, " x[p]hysical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed. * " State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13, (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 
297, 313, (1972)). Moreover, "warrantless searches and seizures 
within a home or other private premises are per se unreasonable 
absent exigent circumstances," Beavers, 859 P.2d at 13. (citing 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, (1967); and "there 
must be a showing by those who seek the exemption ... that the 
exigencies of the situation made [the search] imperative." State 
v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). Furthermore, "[t]he State 
bears the particulary heavy burden of proving the warrantless 
entry into a home falls within the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement." Beavers, 859 P.2d at 13. 
In the present case, law enforcement officers opened the 
door to Johnsons' residence absent consent and ordered that 
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someone come to the door to respond to questioning (Supp. Hrg. at 
9-10, 19). A warrantless "security sweep" of Johnson's home was 
subsequently conducted for expressed officer safety reasons, at 
which time the incriminating material was observed (Supp. Hrg. at 
12, 25). Clearly these actions are subject to Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
Johnson asserts that the trial court erred in concluding 
that the State had sustained its burden of establishing that the 
circumstances surrounding these searches of Johnson's residence 
constitute an exception to the warrant requirement under an 
"exigent circumstances" theory and that the officers had probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion (R. 79-81). Johnson particularly 
challenges the trial court's conclusion that the warrantless 
"security sweep" of the apartment, which resulted in the 
discovery of the marijuana and which was conducted long-after the 
other suspects had been apprehended—was justified. 
A. The warrantless search of Johnson's residence was not 
justified by "exigent circumstances. 
A warrantless search or seizure within a residence is 
"constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are proven." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 
(Utah App. 1997). Such an exception exists to prevent physical 
harm to law enforcement personnel or others, the destruction of 
evidence, or the escape of the suspect. Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 
(citing Beavers, 859 P.2d at 13). However, "exigent 
10 
circumstances exist ^only when the inevitable delay incident to 
obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate 
action.' " Wells, 928 P.2d at 389 (citation omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Satterfield. 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir. 
1984) ) . 
In Beavers, 859 P.2d at 9, this Court concluded that 
"[e]xigent circumstances are those *that would cause a reasonable 
person to believe that entry. . . was necessary to prevent 
physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction 
of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other 
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement 
efforts." (citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 
(9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). However, 
"the mere possibility that a suspect may have a weapon or that 
evidence might be destroyed in insufficient." Wells, 928 P.2d at 
389 (citations omitted). Additionally, "[a]ny legitimate concern 
which police claim for their safety must of necessity arise 
before the challenged entry," and "police cannot create the 
exigency in order to justify a warrantless entry." Beaversf at 
18 (citing "United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 297, 297-98 
(5th Cir. 1986)(where agents knew that their knocking would 
create a need for a security search, exigent circumstances were 
of their own making and the search was improper)"). 
The facts of the Beavers case are particularly relevant 
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here, where the operation of the same exception is at issue. In 
Beavers, officers responded to a call from the manager of an 
apartment regarding a possible assault in progress. Upon arrival 
to the scene, the manager added that he had seen two males enter 
the suspect apartment earlier, but that he did not believe that 
the renter was home. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 10. The officers 
reportedly could hear raised voices coming from within the 
apartment, and they further noted that the door latch had been 
broken and that the door was slightly opened. Id. The officers 
positioned themselves outside the apartment and listened to the 
progressing argument, which appeared to involve the value of 
coats. Id. at 11. The facts of the case further indicate that a 
large number of coats had been stolen from area stores earlier 
that day. Id. at 10. 
Moments later, one of the individuals inside the apartment 
attempted to leave and stepped through the doorway out into the 
hall carrying a new coat. Upon seeing the officers, the suspect 
stepped back across the threshold into the apartment. One 
officer reached through the open doorway to grab the suspect 
before he could retreat further. Id. at 11. At that point the 
officers observed several other individuals within the room. As 
the information received from the manager indicated that the 
renter was Caucasian and the suspects were clearly African-
American, the officers did not believe that the renter was 
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present. Id. The officers further observed one of the suspects 
fumbling in a pile of clothes while the others fled from view. 
In light of the facts known to them and out of an additional 
concern for officer safety, the officers drew their weapons and 
proceeded to enter the apartment and seize all individuals 
present within. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 11. Upon searching the 
apartment, the coats which had been taken earlier in the day were 
located and recovered. The Defendant appealed his ensuing 
convictions of burglary and theft. Id. at 10. 
Upon consideration of the warrantless search in Beavers, 
this Court reversed the defendant's conviction at trial. The 
Court weighed all information available to the officers at the 
time the warrantless entry was made, including: the tip from the 
manager of a crime (assualt) in progress, the information that 
the manager did not believe that the Caucasian renter of the 
suspect apartment was home and the later confirmation that all 
occupants were in fact African American, the fact that the latch 
to the apartment door was broken from a possible forced entry, 
the knowledge that a burglary and theft involving coats had been 
committed earlier that day, the argument the officers overheard 
regarding the value of coats, and the fears the officers had 
regarding their own safety. Taking all those factors into 
consideration, the Court nevertheless delined to uphold the 
warrantless search, stating: "[T]he undisputed factual findings 
13 
indicate that Officer Humphries reached accross the threshold of 
apartment 4B to seize the retreating Davis. Thus, the seizure 
occurred within the constitutionally protected confines of a 
private residence, where citizens enjoy a heightened expectation 
of privacy." Beavers, 859 P. 2d at 13. 
The facts of Beavers closely parallel the facts of the 
present case. In both situations, law enforcement personnel 
responded to calls from residents in apartment buildings 
regarding suspected criminal activity in progress within those 
buildings. In both cases the officers noted some suspicious 
activity at the scene. In Beavers, the officers observed a 
broken door latch, indicating a possible break-in, and they 
overheard an argument over the value of coats which were 
suspected to be stolen property. In the present case, Officer 
Knutzen noted an individual outside the suspect apartment who 
smelled of burnt marijuana (Supp. Hrg. at 17). This person was 
not believed to be a resident of the home (Supp. Hrg. at 8). In 
both cases, the informants relayed to law enforcement officers 
that the renter of the respective apartment was not believed to 
be home (Supp. Hrg. at 7, 22, 29). Finally, in both cases the 
officers eventually entered the apartments, using their 
suspicions of criminal activity and officer safety concerns to 
support their entry (Supp. Hrg. at 12, 33). Johnson asserts that 
the present action is so similar to Beavers that the same result 
14 
should be reached—namely that the actions of law enforcement 
officers should be held in violation of his constitutional 
rights. 
In a related case, State v. Wells, 928 P.2d at 389 (citation 
omitted) this Court concluded that the trial court erred in 
failing to suppress cocaine which was found in the lining of 
defendant's jacket after officers had executed arrest warrants on 
the defendant and handcuffed both suspects at the home. In its 
decision this Court noted "[t]he record reflects that both 
suspects were handcuffed and in custody when the cocaine was 
seized... The officers had controlled the initially chaotic 
situation by the time they searched the jacket. Therefore, the 
initial exigencies which had dissipated by the time of the 
search, could not have justified the cocaine seizure." Id. at 
389. 
Similar to the situation in Wells the record in this case 
reflects that the officers had controlled any initially chaotic 
situation when they apprehended the seven individuals who fled 
from the apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 11, 24). They were secured 
safely outside the apartment and the officers had observed no 
furtive movements or weapons of any kind. Therefore any "initial 
exigencies" had dissipated by the time of the warrantless 
"security sweep" and could not have justified the warrantless 
search. 
15 
Using the first prong of the test outlined in Beavers , the 
trial court determined that the search in question was justified 
based on exigent circumstances. In support of its decision the 
trial court cited the actions of the individuals apprehended 
leaving the scene and their refusal to identify the owner or 
occupant or otherwise explain their actions (R. 80, 82). The 
trial court also relied on a concern for officer safety because 
of potential threats from unknown persons who may have still been 
inside the apartment, and a need to stop what appeared be a 
trespass or burglary that was taking place (R. 80). 
Exigent circumstances have been clearly defined by the Utah 
Court of Appeals as: 
[T]hose "that would cause a reasonable person to believe 
that entry... Was necessary to prevent physical harm to the 
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant 
evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other 
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
enforcement efforts." United States v, McConney, 728 F.2d 
1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). 
"The need for an immediate search must be apparent to the 
police, and so strong as to outweigh the important 
protection of individual rights provided by the warrant 
requirement." U.S. v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 859 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
Beavers, 859 P.2d at 17. 
Under the applicable legal analysis, it is clear that none 
of the circumstances of the instant case qualify as exigent 
circumstances. 
16 
1„ An officer's suspicion of drugs does not in and of 
itself create an exigency. 
This Court considered the application of the exigent 
circumstances doctrine to the suspected use of drugs in State v. 
South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994), remanded on other grounds, 
924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). In South, the officer responded to a 
call of a suspected cellular phone theft. He met the defendant 
at the door and smelled burnt marijuana coming from his clothing 
and from inside the home. Id. at 797. The officer left to 
secure a warrant to search the person of defendant and rfeturned 
with other officers to the home to serve the warrant. In 
executing the search of the defendant, the officers also searched 
the residence and discovered controlled substances and 
paraphernalia. Id. 
At trial, the defendant sought suppression of the evidence, 
arguing that the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by 
searching his residence. The trial court upheld the search, 
ruling that although the search warrant was defective, the 
officers had probable cause to conduct a search of the residence 
based on the plain smell doctrine. Id. 
This Court reversed, holding that, although the plain smell 
doctrine did supply the officer with probable cause, a finding of 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances was required to 
justify a warrantless search. South, 885 P.2d at 799. Further, 
the Court rejected the argument presented by the State that the 
17 
smell of burning marijuana automatically provided officers with 
exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search. "[A] 
home will still be there when officers return with a search 
warrant. Further, officers can secure a home while a search 
warrant is obtained... Therefore, the fact that the marijuana 
may be ^removed, hidden, or destroyed is not, in and of itself, 
an exigent circumstance.'" South, 885 P.2d at 800 (quoting State 
v. Dorson, 615 P.2d 740, 746 (Haw. 1980)). 
The South Court responded appropriately to the State's 
attempt to justify the search under the exigent circumstances 
exception: 
If we were to hold that the mere possibility that evidence 
maybe destroyed constitutes an exigent circumstance, we 
would essentially undermine the exigent circumstance 
requirement since it is possible that most forms of evidence 
can be destroyed before officers return with a warrant. The 
State's concern that marijuana may be hidden or disposed of 
before officers obtain a warrant is outweighed by the 
concern that a warrantless search would violate the 
heightened expectation of privacy in a private home. 
Id (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the present case the alleged presence of 
marijuana should not be considered to be a per se exigent 
circumstance. Under the present facts, Knudsen and Halliday 
really did not personally observe the odor of marijuana until he 
opened the door to the apartment without consent (Supp. Hrg. at 
9, 17, 28). A tip of suspected marijuana use, absent any 
investigatory corroboration, ought not be considered to be an 
18 
emergency situation which would require the application of the 
exigent circumstances exception. The Fourth Amendment would mean 
nothing if law enforcement personnel were allowed to invade the 
privacy of a home for nothing more. 
Furthermore, as the South Court noted, a home cannot be 
quickly and easily driven away, as can a vehicle—particularly 
where as in this case enough officers are present to both control 
the scene and secure a warrant. The same risk of the loss of 
evidence simply does not exist in this situation. Therefore, the 
policy behind the exigent circumstances exception does not 
support a search of a residence under the instant facts, although 
that policy might well permit a warrantless search if a vehicle 
had been involved rather than a residence. Moreover, a 
telephonic warrant could have been sought in this case to perform 
a search efficiently and constitutionally. However, this 
procedure was simply not completed. 
2. No threat of officer safety created a situation which 
could justify the warrantless entry into Johnsonfs 
home. 
The trial court concluded that officers were authorized to 
enter Johnson's residence to conduct a safety sweep for officer 
safety reasons (R. 80). Under direct examination, Officer 
Knudsen testified that the walk-through of Johnson's apartment 
was ordered out of concern for officer safety (Supp. Hrg. at 12). 
In considering the issue of officer safety, the Beavers Court 
19 
stated that: 
Exigent circumstances which would justify a warrantless 
entry a^re those in which a substantial risk of harm to the 
persons involved or to the law enforcement process would 
arise if the police were to delay a search until a warrant 
could be obtained... There must be no practical way to 
avoid these risks and yet follow the Constitution's mandate 
of detached judicial supervision of such intrusions.' 
Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (quoting United States v. Robertson, 606 
F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). 
In its analysis, the Court went on to unequivocally state 
that "[a]ny legitimate concern which police claim for their 
safety must of necessity arise before the challenged entry... 
Moreover, police cannot create the exigency in order to justify a 
warrantless entry." Id. (emphasis added). 
In the present case, there was certainly no articulable 
concern for officer safety preceeding the warrantless entry. 
The pronounced rationale for performing the sweep was to check 
for additional suspects after the first seven occupants fled 
through the rear window. However, it should be noted that this 
scenario did not occur until after the illegal entry of Knudsen 
and Halliday by opening the door without consent. Moreover, when 
Knudsen and Halliday first entered the apartment they saw no one 
and no weapons (Supp. Hrg. at 20, 31). Any arguable exigency at 
the point of the suspect's flight was created solely by law 
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enforcement.3 Prior to Officer Knutzen's entry, the facts known 
to the officers were: drugs were allegedly being used on the 
suspect premises, the renter was suspicioned to be at work, and 
an unknown individual who may or may not have been in the 
apartment smelled of marijuana (Supp. Hrg. at 7-9, 16-17, 22, 
29). These circumstances did not give rise to any fear for the 
safety of the officers or the safety of any citizen bystander. 
The efforts of law enforcement officers would not have been 
endangered or frustrated by securing a warrant to effect lawful 
entry into the home. 
Furthermore, regardless of the cause of the initial 
exigency, the officers in this case had controlled any initially 
chaotic situation when they apprehended the seven individuals who 
fled from the apartment. The suspects were secured safely 
outside the apartment and the officers had observed no furtive 
movements or weapons of any kind (Supp. Hrg. at 11, 20, 24, 31). 
Therefore any "initial exigencies" had dissipated by the time of 
the warrantless "security sweep" and could not have justified the 
warrantless search. See Wells, 928 P.2d at 389. Again, the 
officers could have easily secured the home, as it appears they 
had, and secure the required warrant without violating Johnson's 
3Johnson has previously marshaled the evidence in the 
Statement of Facts but will do so explicitly in the next section 
as it relates to the issue of whether police created any 
exigencies in this case. 
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Fourth Amendment rights. 
3. Any emergency or risk of flight by the suspects was 
created by the officer's illegal entry into the home. 
The trial court's conclusion that the risk of flight of any 
occupants remaining in the apartment justified the warrantless 
entry and search of Johnson's home was clearly erroneous. Law 
enforcement officers cannot create the exigency upon which they 
rely to qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement. In 
so holding the Beavers Court cited to United States v. Munoz-
Guerra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit there 
determined that the agents created their own exigency by 
announcing their presence to the suspects. For that reason, the 
warrantless entry and search that followed was improper. Id. at 
297-98. 
The analysis there is parallel to the facts of the instant 
case. Here, the trial court concluded that Officer Knudsen's 
"[o]pening the door to the apartment, under the totality of the 
facts, did not cause the people to flee out the back of the 
apartment as evidenced by someone closing the door as the officer 
approached followed by movement and rustling and the almost 
simultaneous departure of 8 people out the back as the officer 
was calling out in front (R. 82). 
However, Halliday testified that an individual opened the 
door when he and Knudsen knocked on the apartment door (Supp. 
Hrg. at 24). Moreover, Johnson asserts that Knudsen's testimony 
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(which is supported by Halliday's testimony on this point) 
indicates that his entry and subsequent verbal identification was 
the likely cause of the exigency—the fleeing of the apprehended 
individuals. Both officers testified that upon opening the door 
and following Knudsen's identification, they were informed that 
some individuals were running from the back of the building 
(Supp. Hrg. at 10, 19-20, 30). This assertion is also supported 
by Knudsen's testimony at preliminary hearing: 
Q. Now, you also stated on direct that you knocked on the 
door. The door was completely closed; is that correct? 
A. It was initially open when I looked down there. Then 
when I walked down the hallway it closed. 
Q. But the door was closed when you — 
A. When I got there it was closed, yeah. 
Q. When you say you checked the door, how did you check it? 
Did you rattle the handle or did you knock; what was it that 
you did specifically? 
A. I knocked for quite a while. I could hear some rustling 
going around. Then I just twisted the door handle to see if 
it was unlocked. 
Q. So after you knocked you didn't hear anyone say, "Come 
in," or anything like that, right? 
A. (Inaudible). 
Q. How far did you open the door? 
A. I just pushed it open. It could have went a couple feet 
open. 
Q. And you stated upon direct that you smelled marijuana 
after you pushed the door open; is that correct? 
A. Yeah, immediately. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't smell marijuana before the time you 
opened the door, did you? 
A. I smelled it on the other individual J.C. Thomas. 
Q. But you didn't have any personal knowledge that he had 
been in the apartment, did you? 
A. I didn't. 
Q. You indicate another officer informed you that some 
people were running out of the window of the apartment; is 
that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You got on the radio, or how was it that you were 
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informed of that? 
A. I don't recall. It wasn't on the radio. I think 
somebody had yelled around, "They're running out the back 
window." 
Q. That was after you had opened the door and identified 
your presence; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
(Prelim. Tr. at 18-19). 
It is clear—based on Knudsen's own testimony—that none of 
the occupants within the apartment fled until after the officers 
had opened the door to the apartment. Hence, similar to the 
officers in United States v. Munoz-Guerra,(cited with approval in 
Beavers) the need to pursue the suspects and search the home for 
any hiding individuals arose solely from the officer's actions of 
announcing their presence and the improper, premature entry into 
the home. The officers in this case had every opportunity prior 
to the challenged entry to remain on guard outside the dwelling 
while they complied with the warrant requirement. Indeed, the 
officers did just that after the improper entry was made. The 
fact that the officers were later able to quickly secure a 
warrant clearly demonstrates that this avenue was both reasonable 
and available to them. However, the officers chose instead to 
enter Johnson's private home without a warrant and in violation 
of the Constitution. This type of "shoot from the hip" approach 
is improper and ought not be sanctioned by this Court. 
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4, Suspicions of a possible burglary or trespass in 
progress did not create an exigent circumstance. 
Finally, the trial court justified the entry at issue by 
concluding that the officer's suspicions of burglary and/or 
trespass rose to the level of an exigent circumstance (R. 80-82). 
The record in this case refers to the individual identified as 
"J.C." outside the suspect residence and the time the officers 
questioned the informants. Officer Knudsen spoke with J.C. 
Anderson briefly and determined that he did not reside in the 
apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 8). The officer also noted that J.C. 
smelled of burnt marijuana (Supp. Hrg. at 17). However, Knudsen 
later acknowledged that he had no real knowledge that Anderson 
had ever been in the apartment nor did Knudsen inquire of 
Anderson as to the apartment's owner (Supp. Hrg. at 16). 
Therefore, at this stage in the scenario, any suspicions of 
burglary or trespass were tenuous at best and solely based upon 
the complainants assertion that they did not believe the owner 
was present (Supp. Hrg. at 7, 22, 29). 
Furthermore, based on the testimony presented by Officer 
Knutzen at the Preliminary Hearing, it is clear that the • 
suspicions maintained by law enforcement officers prior to the 
warrantless entry were directed at the possible marijuana usage, 
not at a suspected burglary. It was not until after the entry, 
and the attempted flight by the suspects which was directly 
caused by that entry, that any suspicions regarding a burglary or 
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trespass were raised.4 The State ought not be permitted to rely 
on knowledge that the officers obtained post-entry. Johnson 
respectfully submits that only the facts known to the officers at 
the time of the challenged entry, when Knudsen opened the door 
without consent and announced his presence and demand to speak 
with someone, should be considered. Testimony offered at the 
Preliminary Hearing clearly demonstrates that, at the time of the 
4During Direct Examination regarding the initial contact 
between law enforcement and the informants, the Officer responded 
to the following questioning: 
Q. ... I asked you about a burglary. Did the persons 
outside tell you that the people in the apartment did not 
live there, or what did they say about that? 
A. They said they believed that the individual who they 
believed lived there was at work, and didn't know any of the 
people downstairs. The said— they brought up the initial 
marijuana usage at that time. So I was just thinking it was 
suspicious that these individuals were in the house at this 
time. 
Q. Did you suspect that the people inside the house were 
not connected with the home? 
A. I was unsure at the time. Didn't know exactly what was 
going on downstairs. 
(R. 128, p. 6)(emphasis added). 
In further Direct, Officer Knutzen described the pursuit and 
detention of the suspects following the entry to the residence: 
Q. After you caught those seven people did you determine if 
any of them lived in the apartment? 
A. I did. I brought them back to the residence, sat them 
down on the sidewalk, and began to question them as to who 
lived in the apartment. 
Q. Did any of them live there? 
A. They stated, "No." When I asked them who lived in the 
apartment and asked for any names, they all motioned with 
their bodies that they didn't know. 
Q. What did you do next? 
A. I was concerned about a possible burglary at that time, 
because nobody was claiming they knew who lived in the 
apartment. 
(R. 128, p. 9)(emphasis added). 
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entry, the officer suspected possible marijuana usage, not a 
possible burglary. The suspicion of burglary and/or trespass did 
not arise until after the warrantless entry gave rise to the foot 
pursuit, and the subsequent detention and questioning of the 
suspects. 
Moreover, even if the officers in this case did suspect a 
burglary before the first warantless entry, the search would 
still not be justified. Recall that in Beavers the officers had 
in their possession all of the following information: the tip 
from the manager of a crime (assualt) in progress, the 
information that the manager did not believe that the Caucasian 
renter of the suspect apartment was home and the later 
confirmation that all occupants were in fact African American, 
the fact that the latch to the apartment door was broken from a 
possible forced entry, the knowledge that a burglary and theft 
involving coats had been committed earlier that day, the argument 
the officers overheard regarding the value of coats, and the 
fears the officers had regarding their own safety. All of this 
was insufficient to justify the warrantless entry that occurred. 
In this case, contrary to Beavers, there was no broken latch 
or any signs of forced entry or any explicit suggestion of a 
burglary in progress. Unlike the officers in Beavers who had 
definite reason for knowing that the individuals in the apartment 
were not the owners or residents, in this case there was only the 
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potential that there may have been someone remaining in the 
apartment who did not reside there. Clearly, if the 
circumstances in Beavers was insufficient to justify a 
warrantless entry, then the circumstances surrounding the entry 
into Johnson's residence require the same conclusion- that the 
warrantless entry and subsequent search was not justified by 
exigent circumstances. 
B. The Utah Constitution provides additional protections 
against warrantless searches above the threshold provided by 
the United States Constitution. 
Although the language of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution mirrors its federal counterpart, in application its 
effect may be markedly different. The Utah Supreme Court so 
noted in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). Citing its 
own language from and earlier decision, the Larocco Court held 
that "^choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat 
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the 
federal courts.7" Id. at 465 (quoting State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 
1219, 1221 at n. 8 (Utah 1988)). 
Using that rationale, the Utah Supreme Court elected to set 
a higher state standard for applying the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement contained within the State Constitution. 
Defendant submits that the federal courts' interpretation of the 
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exigent circumstances exception, much like the interpretation of 
the automobile exception, has the potential to vacillate and not 
provide the consistent protection necessary. The citizens of 
Utah should be protected from arbitrary actions of law 
enforcement that are evidenced by the facts of this case. 
Accordingly, the present search should be overturned under both 
the federal and the state constitutions. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Johnson respectfully asks that this Court conclude that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in 
concluding that the warrantless entry and subsequent search of 
his residence were justified under an "exigent circumstances" 
theory. Accordingly, Johnson asks that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand the matter to the district court with 
directions that Johnson's plea may be withdrawn and with orders 
to suppress the illegally obtained evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
 irJ^K day of September, 1998. 
•7 ) , , I'^A 
Margaret P. Lindsa 
Counsel for Johnscfh 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
STUART EARL JOHNSENf : Case No. 961401667 FS 
Defendant(s). s Judge Guy R. Burningham 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
presiding, on the 1st day of July, 1997. The Plaintiff was represented 
by Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor. The Defendant was 
present, in person, and represented by Christine Sagendorf. The Court 
heard evidence on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Being advised in 
the premises, the Court makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 16, 1997 police officers were dispatched to 980 
North 646 West in Provo because a neighbor was complaining about 
marijuana being used in an adjoining apartment. 
2. Officers arrived, just before midnight, and spoke on the street 
outside the apartment to two men, Troy Guevara and Jason Campbell, who 
stated that they lived upstairs from the complained-of apartment and 
could smell the odor of burned or burning marijuana coming from the 
apartment. The men told officers that they didn't believe the renter or 
owner of the apartment was present but was at work and that they didn! t 
know or recognize any of the people in the apartment. They pointed to 
a third person and told officers that "he's one of them". 
3. Officers spoke to the third man, J.C. Thomas Asderson. The 
officer who spoke to Anderson, Officer Knutzen, could detect an odor of 
marijuana coming from Anderson. Anderson said he didn't live in the 
apartment and was just visiting. 
4. Officer Knutzen, at that point, reasonably suspected that a 
burglary or trespass might be taking place. 
5. The officers then approached the suspect apartment which was 
the basement or downstairs apartment. As the officers started at the 
top of the stairs to go down to the door they noticed that the front 
door to the apartment was open one to two feet. As they walked down the 
stairs, someone from inside shut the door, 
6. Officer Knutzen knocked several times on the door. As he 
knocked and waited, he heard a great deal of rustling and movement 
inside the apartment. At this point the officer had a heightened 
suspicion of criminal activity within the apartment. The officer 
checked the front door to see if it was locked and discovered that it 
was not locked. He then pushed the door open to approximately the same 
as it had been when he started down the stairs. The room was dark and 
nothing was seen or heard by the officer when the door was opened. The 
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officer called out that he was a police officer and wished to speak to 
someone. When the door was opened the officer caught a strong smell of 
burned marijuana. The officers were, at that point, told that people 
were climbing out of the back window of the apartment and fleeing the 
scene. 
7. Several officers participated for about 10 to 15 minutes 
chasing and apprehending 7 to 8 people who had climbed „out the back 
window and fled the scene. All were brought back and asked if they 
lived in the apartment or knew who did. All replied that they did not 
live there and none could identify the owner or tenant. 
8. Opening the door to the apartment, under the totality of the 
facts, did not cause the people to flee out the back of the apartment as 
evidenced by someone closing the door as the officer approached followed 
by movement and rustling and the almost simultaneous departure of 8 
people out the back as the officer was calling out in front. 
9. Before conducting a protective sweep of the apartment, officers 
had determined, (1) that the neighbors had detected the odor of 
marijuana and knew the tenant to not be home; (2) that a person 
identified by the neighbors as one of the people who had been in the 
apartment did smell of burned marijuana; (3) that someone had closed the 
door of the apartment as the officers approached on the stairs to speak 
with the people in the apartment; (4) that an odor of marijuana was 
emanating from the apartment's door when it was opened by the officer; 
(5) that at least 7 people fled out the back window as officers were 
attempting to speak with them at the front door; and, (6) that the 7 
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people who fled, when caught and brought back to the scene did not live 
in the apartment and could not identify who the tenant was. 
10. Out of concern for officer safety for fear that an additional 
person or persons might still be inside the apartment and also because 
the officers felt that any additional persons inside the apartment did 
not belong there and were committing a trespass or burglary, two 
officers walked through the apartment to check for additional suspects 
as a "security sweep". 
11. During the sweep officers found the defendant hiding in a 
locked bathroom. Officers also saw drug paraphernalia which was not 
seized but merely described in an affidavit in support of a search 
warrant which was obtained and executed, resulting in the seizure of the 
evidence sought to be suppressed by this motion. 
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Officers had a reasonable suspicion that the crimes of 
trespass, burglary and/or use of controlled substances were being 
committed in the apartment after hearing the statements of the 
complaining citizens and speaking to the third man identified as one of 
the group in the apartment. 
2. Officers had probable cause to believe that criminal conduct was 
occurring within the apartment and that important evidence would be 
found in the apartment upon considering the statements of the neighbors, 
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the encounter with the man identified as "one of them", observing the 
door to the apartment close as the officers descended the stairs, 
observing the sound of movement and rustling inside the apartment before 
knocking on the door. 
3. The occupants1 flight from a rear window of the apartment as 
officers were attempting to make contact at the front door was virtually 
simultaneous with the actions of the door opening an£l calling to 
occupants by the officer. The flight was not caused by the officer's 
actions. 
4. The actions of the occupants, however, in fleeing the scene and 
then refusing to identify the owner or occupant or otherwise explain 
their actions provided exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless 
entry into the home to determine if any crime was ongoing. 
5. The security sweep of the apartment after apprehending the 
people who fled from the apartment was justified by the probable cause 
that a crime had been or was occurring within the apartment coupled with 
exigent circumstances consisting of a legitimate concern for officer 
safety because of a potential threat from unknown persons who may have 
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still been inside the apartment and the need to stop what appeared to be 
a trespass or burglary that was taking place. 
DATED this I( day of August, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
GU? R. /BURNlNGl 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CHRISTIN: 
ATTORNEY 
SENDORF 
JDEFENDANT 
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